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Raymond Hinnebusch 
 
The theme of this issue of Syria Studies is “contextualizing the 
Syrian Uprising.” Two papers, one macro, the other micro, 
provide quite different and complementary insights into the 
causes of the Uprising. Students of Syria are like the blind man 
and the elephant: not only are they “blind” when it comes to 
penetrating an especially opaque political system, but they tend 
each, as a result, to hit on one aspect of the many sided regime 
that has governed Syria since 1963. Michael Dostal’s macro 
level analysis puts the Syrian uprising in a broad theoretical 
and historical context delineating five separate layers, which, as 
they are combined, provide cumulatively more adequate 
understandings of the tangent of the regime from its early 
formation in the 1960s to the Syrian Uprising. The formation of 
the Ba’th regime had three distinguishable aspects. The main 
aspect in the first decade of Ba’th rule was the populist 
character by which a regime emerging from the overthrow of 
the old landed oligarchy sought to survive by mobilizing a 
popular constituency through, notably, land reform and 
nationalizations. However, the regime was only consolidated 
by Hafiz al-Asad’s deployment of several additional aspects of 
the regime, the sectarian factor and rent. He constructed a neo-
patrimonial regime, combining Alawi sectarian solidarity and 
control of the security apparatus with rent funded clientalism 
by which formerly hostile Sunni bourgeois elements were co-
opted; and thereby forged a new cross-sectarian “state class,” 
 v 
with a stake in the regime.  Two international factors also left 
an enduring mark on Syria. Dostal cites the neo-Gramscian 
paradigm, which examines the interaction between 
international and domestic political-economies, to explore the 
impact of the global hegemony of neo-liberalism on social 
forces and public policy in Syria under Bashar al-Asad: the 
results were similar to those experienced across the Middle 
East, chiefly the rise of class inequality and crony capitalism. 
Finally, within the geopolitics paradigm, Syria, by virtue of its 
pivotal position and fierce independence, has always been an 
object of external ambitions and became, with the Uprising, the 
battleground of a new “Struggle for the Middle East” between 
rival states. 
 If Dostal focuses on macro-structure, Omar Imady 
shifts the focus to micro-level agency. His article has important 
implications for a key root of the Uprising. The Uprising 
originated in the rural periphery and only later spread to the 
cities and without, therefore, the disaffection of the rural 
population, the regime’s initial constituency, there would, 
arguably, either have been no uprising or it would have been 
readily contained, as was the Muslim Brotherhood insurgency 
of 1976-82. The regime’s loss of its rural constituency resulted 
from a convergence of several factors, including neo-liberal 
reductions in subsidies for agricultural inputs and fuel for 
agricultural machinery and removals of protections for 
agricultural tenants (acquired under the agrarian relations law); 
and the devastating drought that ravaged large parts of the 
northeast, inducing a flight to the urban banlieues that became 
areas of concentrated disaffection. But just as important, was 
an explosion in the agrarian population on relatively fixed land 
resources. Tellingly, while the fertility rate in the cities was 2 
children/family in the rural East it was 6 per family, putting 
unbearable pressure on a fragile ecology. This also meant that 
the many sons of the former generation of peasants who has 
been incorporated by land reform and cooperatives into the 
regime base during the 1960-70s were left adrift, without land 
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or livelihood and forced to enter a saturated non-agricultural 
labour market. Imady shows how their needs could have been 
addressed by encouraging self-help initiatives that could have 
given them a stake in the status quo. He shows how a prototype 
micro-finance scheme was very successful, yet, for just that 
reason, was seen as threatening by some elements of the 
regime. He suggests that the failure of the rural credit initiative, 
far from accidental, was built into the regime’s governing 
practices, notably its almost pathological fear of any 
independent initiative it did not control, the rivalries and 
jealousies of the bureaucracy, and the corrupt practices, 
inherent in neo-patrimonialism, that partly motivated actors to 
assert their control over every activity. Bashar al-Asad’s bid to 
move toward a market economy required these pathologies be 
combatted, but it is appears that there was no qualitative 
difference from his father’s statist era in this respect; hence his 
“economic reform” produced many negative side effects, 
notably the discarding of the populist social contract, without 
unleashing the initiative and entrepreneurship that would have 
been needed to make it a success.   
 
 
